The Indian Army’s approach to internal conflict has long been defined by its experience in the Northeast. As the state reflects on decades of unrest, historians often look back at how the counterinsurgency doctrine in Nagaland and Mizoram evolved. In the 1950s and 60s, the military faced a brand of warfare for which it had no formal manual. It was the battalion commanders on the ground who eventually rewired the doctrine, moving away from conventional force toward a more nuanced, political approach.
When the Naga insurgency began in 1954, the Army initially treated it as a tactical challenge. However, they soon realized that traditional mountain warfare could not defeat a guerrilla force supported by the local population. This realization forced a shift in thinking. Commanders began to view the insurgent not as an “enemy” but as a “disgruntled citizen.” This philosophy eventually became the bedrock of the Indian Army’s sub-conventional warfare strategy.
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The Naga Hills: Testing the Iron Fist
In the early days of the Naga conflict, the Army relied heavily on “superiority of force.” Battalions like the 2 Maratha LI (Kali Panchvi) were among the first to be inducted. Commanders quickly found that the hit-and-run tactics of the Naga Federal Army made traditional formations ineffective. The thick jungles and steep ridges of the Naga Hills required a decentralized command structure.
It was during this era that battalion commanders began to innovate. They shifted from large-scale operations to small-team ambushes and “cordon and search” missions. One notable success was the capture of Mau Angami in 1969 by the 9 Maratha LI. This operation blunted a China-trained group of nearly 300 insurgents. Officers like Major Y.S. Shinde and Captain J.J. Singh (who later became the Army Chief) played pivotal roles. Their ability to adapt to trans-border dynamics helped prevent the insurgency from overwhelming the region’s fragile geography.
Mizoram and the “Grouping of Villages”
The Mizo uprising of 1966 presented a different set of challenges. The Mizo National Front (MNF) launched a coordinated strike that briefly seized control of Aizawl. In response, the Indian Army implemented the “Grouping of Villages” scheme in 1967. This strategy aimed to isolate the guerrillas from their civilian support base.
The military moved thousands of villagers into “Protected and Progressive Villages” (PPVs). While this strategy was controversial and faced legal hurdles from the Gauhati High Court, it fundamentally altered the counterinsurgency doctrine in Nagaland and Mizoram. Commanders on the ground had to act as both soldiers and administrators. They managed food supplies, healthcare, and education within these camps. This dual role forced the Army to adopt the “Hearts and Minds” (WHAM) philosophy, realizing that military victory was impossible without civilian cooperation.
Battalion Commanders as Doctrine Innovators
The true rewiring of the doctrine happened at the unit level. Battalion commanders realized that conventional artillery and airpower were counterproductive in domestic settings. Except for a brief use of air strikes in Aizawl in 1966, the Army strictly moved toward “minimum force.” Commanders began to emphasize intelligence-led operations over blanket sweeps.
These officers learned to negotiate with village elders and church leaders. They understood that every civilian casualty created ten new insurgents. This experience led to the 2006 formalization of the “Iron Fist in a Velvet Glove” doctrine. It stressed that military operations must always support a larger political resolution. The creation of the Naga Regiment in 1970, which included former underground cadres, was a direct result of this innovative thinking. It showed that the Army was willing to integrate the very people it once fought.
Lessons from the Northeast Frontiers
The campaigns in the Northeast taught the Indian Army that legitimacy is the most powerful weapon. By focusing on nation-building and infrastructure, the Army helped bridge the gap between the frontier and the mainland. The Mizoram Peace Accord of 1986 remains one of the world’s most successful examples of an insurgency ending through a negotiated settlement.
Today, as the Army monitors the India-Myanmar border and handles modern challenges, the lessons of the past remain relevant. The counterinsurgency doctrine in Nagaland and Mizoram was not born in a boardroom in New Delhi. It was forged in the humid jungles and remote outposts by commanders who dared to change their methods. Their legacy is a military that views peace, not just the absence of conflict, as the ultimate objective of its operations.
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